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CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
Sotirios A. Barber∗ 
James E. Fleming∗∗ 
In The Constitution in Wartime: Beyond Alarmism and Complacency, Mark 
Tushnet distinguishes two voices: “alarmists who see in every action taken by 
the Bush [A]dministration a portent of gross restrictions on the civil liberties of 
all Americans, and administration shills who see in those actions entirely 
reasonable, perhaps even too moderate, accommodations of civil liberties to 
the new realities of national security.”1  Tushnet’s volume contains essays, 
including one by us,2 which he judges to lie “beyond alarmism and 
complacency” (or perhaps between alarmism and complacency).  But critics of 
the Bush Administration’s theory of the unitary executive may be alarmed by 
what we say here, and defenders of that theory may view us as complacent 
shills for the Obama Administration! 
In this Essay, we consider constitutional theory and the future of the unitary 
executive.  As we see it, at least in a sense that predates Bush Administration 
apologist John Yoo,3 the unitary executive is here to stay.  Precisely because 
the American constitutional executive is a unitary power, President Obama can 
close Guantanamo unilaterally, without Congress’s leave.  President Obama, 
on his own, can also revoke Bush’s executive orders regarding secrecy.  He 
can renounce Bush Administration memoranda attempting to justify torture, 
and he can prohibit further acts of torture during his tenure in office.  Obama 
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 ∗∗ James E. Fleming is Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
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 1 Mark Tushnet, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND 
COMPLACENCY 1 (Mark Tushnet, ed., 2005). 
 2 Sotirios A. Barber & James E. Fleming, War, Crisis, and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 
WARTIME, supra note 1, at 232. 
 3 See generally JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005) [hereinafter YOO, WAR AND PEACE].  Other prominent recent works defending 
Bush’s vision of the unitary executive include STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
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cannot, however, coherently renounce the unitary executive at the same time 
that he acts unilaterally to undo excesses of the last unitary executive. In any 
case, to recall Justice Robert Jackson’s formulation from Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the “imperatives of events and contemporary 
imponderables” are going to require strong executive power.4  The same basic 
thought appeared some five generations before Justice Jackson’s time when 
Alexander Hamilton, the first proponent of a unitary executive, said in The 
Federalist that because “[t]he circumstances that endanger the safety of nations 
are infinite . . . no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power 
to which the care of it is committed.”5 
This Essay outlines part of a larger project on executive power.  Like that 
larger work, these remarks are as much about the future of constitutional 
theory—the form it should take and the questions it should address—as they 
are about the future of the unitary executive. 
John Yoo claims to derive his theory of the unitary executive from The 
Federalist.6  We share his assumption that The Federalist is a good place to 
start.  Unlike The Federalist, however, Yoo fails to embed the unitary 
executive in proper context: a broad theory of coordinated institutions.  When 
Yoo says that “Federalists defended the centralization of the executive power 
in the president precisely in order to enable the federal government to respond 
to the unknowable threats of a dangerous world,”7 he relies on Hamilton’s 
argument in The Federalist No. 70 that good government is impossible without 
“energy in the executive,” that unity in the Executive is essential to energy in 
 
 4 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 5 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 6 YOO, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 3, at 21. 
 7 Id.  (further citing twice in the same paragraph Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 70).  Yoo also stated in 
an essay published by the Heritage Foundation:  
But the text and structure of the Constitution, as well as its application over the last two centuries, 
confirm that the President can begin military hostilities without the approval of Congress.  The 
Constitution does not establish a strict war-making process because the Framers understood that 
war would require the speed, decisiveness, and secrecy that only the presidency could bring.  
“Energy in the Executive,” Alexander Hamilton argued in the Federalist Papers, “is a leading 
character in the definition of good government.  It is essential to the protection of the community 
against foreign attacks.”  And, he continued, “the direction of war most peculiarly demands those 
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”  
John Yoo, Energy in the Executive: Re-examining Presidential Power in the Midst of the War on Terrorism, 
FIRST PRINCIPLES SERIES NO. 4 (Heritage Found., Wash. D.C.) Apr. 24, 2006, at 2 (footnote omitted) (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1980)), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/PublicDiplomacy/fp4.cfm. 
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government, and that unity in the Executive is conducive to “[d]ecision, 
activity, secrecy, and dispatch.”8 
But Yoo does not think like Hamilton.  Yoo thinks like an advocate for 
policies of a particular administration or party during a particular historical 
period.  Because Hamilton thinks holistically as a Framer, he situates his 
unitary executive in a broad theory of coordinated institutions in which 
different sets of power shape and limit each other.  Yoo fails to embed his 
unitary executive in a general theory of coordinated constitutional functions 
like that articulated by Hamilton in The Federalist. 
This broader context of executive power has three parts.  One is an 
institutional context that includes the Congress, the courts, and institutional 
norms like democracy and the rule of law.  Another  is a substantive context: 
constitutional goods or ends to which constitutional institutions are committed.  
A third is a philosophical context: the view of the human good and the human 
condition that is believed to justify the constitutional ensemble of substantive 
goods and institutional means. 
Ignoring much of this broader context, Yoo has a partial and distorted 
understanding of executive power.  Yoo’s conceptualization has a striking 
payoff: a cipher like Bush can support incompetent and unconstitutional acts 
by invoking a giant like Lincoln.  This issue is discussed further below. 
We begin with the philosophical context.  In our contribution to the 
Tushnet book, we invoke Lincoln and argue that the executive power is 
constitutionally obligated to restore or maintain the conditions for 
constitutional democracy and the rule of law.9  Our claim is that Lincoln 
violated the Constitution to save the Union and the Constitution.10  Violate the 
Constitution to save it?  There is no paradox because as a practical matter (and 
as a theoretical matter too), fidelity to the Constitution always presupposes 
material conditions that the Constitution cannot guarantee.11  Lincoln felt that 
the Civil War might be lost unless he displaced Congress’s powers to initiate 
the raising of armies and navies, to authorize spending, and to suspend the writ 
of habeas corpus.12  The conditions of the Civil War brought various 
 
 8 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 9 Barber & Fleming, supra note 2, at 236–37, 242–43. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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constitutional provisions into irresolvable conflict.13  Abiding by the letter of 
some provisions meant disobeying others: namely, the clause requiring the 
President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”14 and the 
President’s oath to preserve and defend the Constitution.15  The Constitution is 
silent as to how to resolve these conflicts—fully constitutional conduct is 
impossible.  All one can hope for are pro-constitutional actions or, as we refer 
to them, constitutionalist actions—actions that restore the conditions for 
honoring the Constitution—actions that are constitutionalist though not 
constitutional.  This kind of argument is easier to accept in war than in peace 
because war exposes the essentially positive nature of the Constitution—its 
overriding commitment to substantive ends like security and the general 
welfare—and the corresponding positive duties of those who take the oath to 
preserve and defend it. 
Bush did not disagree.  He acted as a positive constitutionalist when he 
compromised constitutional safeguards to secure the nation against terrorism.  
But conservative constitutional theorists have yet, officially, to face that fact.  
Positive constitutionalism has an openly favorable view of government as the 
agent of collective aspirations.  Conservative constitutionalism purports to 
view government as a necessary evil, with certain exceptions of course.  The 
exceptions arise in the following areas: foreign and military affairs, criminal 
justice, and, for many conservatives, sexual morality.  The exceptions are big 
enough to expose the libertarianism of conservatism as a pretext.  
Conservatives are as pro-government as anyone when it comes to ends they 
seek to promote, like national security, law and order (for individuals if not for 
corporations), and selective forms of sexual restraint.  Yet even among 
conservatives, the anti-government mask is effective.  Conservatives see 
themselves as moderate libertarians; they do not see themselves as positive 
constitutionalists committed to a view of society different from that of their 
openly pro-government counterparts on the left.  As a consequence, they do 
not fully explicate and defend the society to which their constitutional 
doctrines point.  They have a positive constitutionalism of their own, but they 
seem unaware of that fact; and they do not develop and expose their positive 
agenda for all to see. 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
 15 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
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Chief Justice William Rehnquist, the author of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,16 
was negative constitutionalism’s most visible proponent.  Yet in his book, All 
the Laws but One: Civil Liberties in Wartime, Rehnquist practically embraced 
the idea inter arma silent leges—that during war constitutional restraints are 
silent.17  For Rehnquist, when constitutional forms, rights, and limits are 
suspended, indeed the laws are silent, and everything is permitted to the 
Executive.18  Rehnquist thus subscribed to part of Lincoln’s view but not all of 
it.  He failed to see, as Lincoln saw, that when the Constitution is suspended, 
the Executive has restorative obligations—affirmative obligations to work 
actively toward restoring conditions in which the Constitution can function as 
law once again.  These affirmative obligations include the pursuit of domestic 
conditions (in Lincoln’s case, the end of the secessionist threat) that would 
permit government by constitutional forms, rights, and limits.  In sum, unlike 
Lincoln, Rehnquist failed to see that executive power must be committed to 
restoring or maintaining the conditions for constitutional democracy and the 
rule of law. 
President Bush may or may not have realized this, but conservative 
constitutional theory denies affirmative constitutional obligations.  In 
DeShaney, Chief Justice Rehnquist denied even a minimal duty of the night-
watchman state: the protection of a four-year-old child from the perfectly 
predictable (because it was repeated and well-reported) violence of a deranged 
father.19  And Bush’s conception of the war on terror as permanent brought 
into question the possibility of restoring the conditions for the rule of law. 
Next, we will sketch the institutional context.  The Constitution does put 
the President in a strategic setting for exercising the kind of power that Yoo 
contemplates.  We can distinguish between the delegated powers of the 
Presidency and the resulting powers Yoo contemplates—those resulting from 
the President’s strategic position in the constitutional scheme.  But a 
President’s exercise of strategic power can be constitutional only if it can 
eventually take a form that comports with constitutional criteria.  It has to 
express itself in a way that can be regularized or regulated in laws and applied 
by courts.  Eventually, strategic power must be reconciled to delegated power. 
 
 16 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 17 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998). 
 18 Id. 
 19 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 189–90. 
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More generally, we need a theory of the unitary executive that situates the 
Executive in the context of an institutional theory of the conflictual 
Constitution.20  Bush, together with the theory upon which he acted, was 
contemptuous of Congress and the courts and would brook no disagreement 
from, conflict with, or limitation by those institutions.  Indeed, the Republican-
controlled Congress capitulated to that view.  Then-Republican Speaker of the 
House Dennis Hastert, rather than conceiving of Congress as an institution 
with responsibilities to check executive power, publicly proclaimed that his job 
was to enact the President’s agenda.21  Hastert spoke and acted as if we have a 
parliamentary system rather than a presidential system with institutional checks 
and balances.22 
Within institutional theories of the conflictual Constitution of the sort 
elaborated by Mariah Zeisberg and Jeffrey Tulis, Congress has responsibilities 
not simply to defer to or serve as an agent of executive power but also to 
contest and check it.23  President Bush, Vice President Cheney, John Yoo, and 
Karl Rove all made a serious effort to establish a de facto parliamentary system 
in place of a presidential system of institutional checks and balances.  They 
aspired to install a permanent Republican majority led by a unitary and 
unilateral executive and supported by a permanently pliant Congress and 
judiciary—contrary to the separation of powers and the deliberative politics 
reflected in the American constitutional regime.  They sought to govern 
through secrecy and by leveraging fear—waging a permanent war on 
terrorism, keeping the public permanently in the dark about what was going on 
in government, and maintaining a permanently fearful citizenry.24  To achieve 
 
 20 This sort of theory has been proposed by political scientists Mariah Zeisberg and Jeffrey Tulis.  See, 
e.g., Mariah Zeisberg, Constitutional War Authority: A Relational Conception (2009) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with Professor Zeisberg, University of Michigan, Dept. of Political Science); Mariah 
Zeisberg, The Relational Conception of War Powers, in THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Jeffrey 
K. Tulis & Stephen Macedo eds., forthcoming 2010); JEFFREY K. TULIS, DEMOCRATIC DECAY AND THE 
POLITICS OF DEFERENCE (forthcoming 2011); Jeffrey K. Tulis, On Congress and Constitutional Responsibility, 
89 B.U. L. REV. 515 (2009). 
 21 As Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein put it: “Speaker Hastert . . . proclaimed that his primary 
responsibility was not to lead and defend the first branch of government but to pass the president’s legislative 
program.”  THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS IS FAILING 
AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 139 (2006). 
 22 Id. at 7 (“In its highly centralized leadership and fealty to the presidential agenda, the post-2000 House 
of Representatives looks more like a House of Commons in a parliamentary system than a House of 
Representatives in a presidential system.”); ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? 60 
(2006). 
 23 See supra note 20. 
 24 See, e.g., ANDREW BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: HOW AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY 
WAR (2005); BENJAMIN R. BARBER, FEAR’S EMPIRE: WAR, TERRORISM AND DEMOCRACY (2003); JACK 
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their ends, they promoted the political power of those religious evangelicals 
who treat disagreement with their beliefs as either sinful or unpatriotic.  There 
were no clearer signs of their hostility to constitutional institutions than their 
secrecy and their treatment of critics as traitors and heretics.  They could not 
conceive of a loyal opposition; opposition to them meant disloyalty to the 
country. 
These ambitions reflected Bush’s sense that his instincts were in tune with 
God’s will and the market’s hidden hand, an attitude at odds with the 
scientifically-informed political planning exemplified by the American 
Founding.25  Indeed, Bush created a modern analogue to the divine right of 
kings: certain and infallible executives with direct communications from God 
do not need deliberative processes for governance; they need only executive 
processes for carrying out their infallible convictions. 
In light of the results of the Bush years at home and abroad, constitutional 
commentary should be open to an alternative model of presidential power.  
One such alternative is the Hamiltonian model sketched above—the strong but 
institutionally situated Executive.  This model includes legislators with a sense 
of institutional identity and loyalty along with courts that are committed, 
willing, and able to contest and check executive power.  We have no objection 
to a Hamiltonian presidency—one that remains situated within an institutional 
scheme and responsible to its norms.  The Bush presidency demonstrated that 
checks on presidential power are best seen in a positive light, as means for 
preventing mistakes. 
To recapitulate: the Executive exists in an institutional context that includes 
Congress and the courts.  The President is not up there in some detached 
posture.  Even when emergencies force the President to act extra-
constitutionally, he or she must return to Congress and the courts for post-hoc 
approval, as Lincoln did.  This means that the President’s actions must meet 
the formal and substantive moral standards requisite for constitutional laws.  
Secrecy might be essential in times of war, but secret institutions (like Bush’s 
foreign prisons) defeat the visibility that is essential to democratic 
responsibility and the rule of law.  By assuming that the “war on terror” would 
 
GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); 
STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR’S CAPE: AMERICA’S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO TERROR (2007); ROBERT M. 
PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW (2007); JANE MAYER, THE DARK 
SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008). 
 25 SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC 
QUESTIONS 36 (2007). 
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be more or less permanent, Yoo depreciated the institutions and principles of 
public responsibility represented by Congress and the courts.  This transformed 
Hamilton’s unitary-but-attached-and-checked executive into Bush’s unitary-
but-detached-and-elevated executive. 
Finally, we turn to the substantive context of constitutional goods or ends.  
This context has three aspects: a hierarchy of goods—the goods of the large 
commercial republic;26 a set of appropriate attitudes held by the citizens or at 
least the leadership community of the large commercial republic; and certain 
virtues that these goods and attitudes presuppose. 
The Federalist situates executive power in an overarching picture of the 
good life, the ends to which the Constitution is an instrument.  Constitutional 
goods or ends presuppose certain attitudes, virtues, and character.  Most 
liberals who criticize Yoo’s theory (and Bush’s execution of it) criticize it in 
the wrong way.27  This is because these liberals, like conservatives, have lost 
touch with the broader concept of constitutional ends and personal character 
traits that accompany appreciation of these ends.  Thus, current constitutional 
discourse—both conservative and liberal—ignores substantive constitutional 
ends and personal character. 
Yoo invokes not only The Federalist but also Lincoln as authorizing 
Bush’s theory and practice of executive power.28  The big difference between 
Abraham Lincoln and George Bush lies in Bush’s failure to appreciate the 
broader constitutional context of executive power and to display the attitudes 
associated with the pursuit of real goods by actors who are aware of their 
fallibility and their responsibilities to others.  Had Yoo appreciated all aspects 
of this context, he would have been able to articulate in theoretical terms what, 
we venture, everyone feels in their gut: George Bush was no Abraham 
Lincoln!  Put another way, the problem with Bush and Cheney, in addition to 
their view of executive power, is that they are Bush and Cheney—they lack 
appreciation of constitutional ends and even more so the attitudes and character 
presupposed by those ends and requisite for their competent pursuit. 
 
 26 Elsewhere we have elaborated these goods.  See id. at 35–55. 
 27 See, for example, the otherwise excellent book, PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW 
EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009). 
 28 See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 97, 113–14, 
121, 122, 148, 238 (2006).  Jack Goldsmith, a leading conservative lawyer and academic who served in the 
Department of Justice during the Bush Administration, has contrasted Bush with Lincoln.  GOLDSMITH, supra 
note 24, at 210–15. 
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Post-Bush, theorists of executive power will have to rethink the connection 
between power, the ends of power, and the character of those who wield 
power.  That connection can be established only by reconnecting constitutional 
institutions to constitutional ends.  Constitutional power must be dedicated to 
certain ends and, because these ends are controversial, must be dedicated to a 
healthy politics—a politics through which the system elaborates the best 
conceptions of constitutional ends in changing circumstances.  Put another 
way, after the Bush Administration, we must reconnect our understanding of 
executive power to an understanding of constitutional ends that such power is 
to pursue. 
The obstacles to doing so are intellectual and cultural.  The intellectual 
obstacles include relativism, moral skepticism, preference utilitarianism, and 
the like.  Why?  Because fallibility presupposes real public goods; and because 
relativism and the rest, each in its own way, deny real public goods.  The 
resurgence of objective conceptions of moral reasoning, including moral 
constructivism and moral realism, has lifted these obstacles.29  But by and 
large, law schools and political science departments have not received word, or 
in any case have obstinately resisted, these developments.  The cultural 
obstacles have been fostered by the market economy, which underwrites or 
reinforces relativism, moral skepticism, and preference utilitarianism.  The 
economic crisis, together with the larger tragedy to the country wrought by the 
Bush presidency, should motivate the intellectual community to rethink its 
orthodoxies.  And this could be a step toward overcoming these cultural 
obstacles.  In the wake of the Bush presidency, the time for “normal science” 
has passed, and constitutional theorists should be prepared to think in 
unconventional terms.  In doing so, constitutional theorists need to develop a 
deeper understanding of the broader context of constitutional commitments, 
institutional checks, and constitutional goods, attitudes, and virtues. 
 
 
 29 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR 
HEDGEHOGS (forthcoming 2010); MICHAEL MOORE, EDUCATING ONESELF IN PUBLIC: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE (2000); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
(1993). 
